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1 | INTRODUCTION 
Turkey has closely monitored the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations 
between the United States and the European Union (EU). Ankara is concerned particularly because it 
has a Customs Union with the European Union (EU) effective since 1996. Specifically, the Customs 
Union, which was supposed to be an interim step towards Turkey’s full EU membership, obliged 
Ankara to negotiate flanking Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with third parties that the Europeans 
have concluded an FTA. However, the Customs Union set no viable mechanisms to incorporate 
Turkey into EU-level commercial policymaking, either for the selection of potential new FTA partners 
or to impel those partners to engage in a follow-up deal with Ankara. Over the past two decades, the 
Turkish governments have pursued concluding EU-mandated FTAs with third parties. Flanking 
agreements often came with some delay since these parties have not been legally obliged and may not 
be economically enthusiastic to negotiate a trade deal with Turkey.1 In this regard, each new FTA 
signed by the EU meant a temporary increase in imports of Turkey from a third party which gained 
de facto duty-free access to the Turkish market via the Customs Union. Each new EU FTA also eroded 
preferential access of Turkish exporters into the EU markets while it allowed European competitors 
to enjoy first-entry advantage in third markets. The challenge has become insurmountable since 2006 
as the EU reinstated its FTA agenda in a more proactive manner by approaching advanced and sizable 
economies such as South Korea and Canada. Furthermore, Turkey’s EU membership talks that started 
in 2005 have not been as productive as Ankara had expected, registering little progress mainly due to 
political drawbacks on both sides and thus leaving the Customs Union as the sole but imperfect 
instrument commercially linking the two parties. 
 
1For instance, Algeria and South Africa continue to avoid initiating talks for a flanking deal with Turkey, while Mexico has 
eventually started negotiations after dragging its feet for more than a decade. Despite the lag between the EU’s deals and 
Turkey’s, Ankara has succeeded in signing a flanking FTA with most third parties that the EU engaged with. Of 23 FTAs that 
Turkey has signed, 18 are currently in force and others are in the ratification stage. Negotiations are underway with 12 other 
parties (Atalay, 2011, p. 3). See Turkish Ministry of Economy and European Commission’s websites for details: 





Against this backdrop, the TTIP negotiations have triggered strong reactions in Turkey in a manner 
reflecting Ankara’s ongoing frustration with the Customs Union as well as with long-lasting, but 
ineffectual EU accession bid. Observers have argued that a transatlantic trade deal without Ankara 
would shrink Turkish exporters’ markets in Europe to the US’s favour and inevitably deflect trade 
from the United States into Turkey (e.g., Cetingulec, 2014; Kirisci, 2013, pp. 13–16; Yesilyurt & Paul, 
2013). The impact studies by analysts of Germany’s Ifo Institute fuelled the debate as they suggested 
that Turkey’s economic losses would reach 2.5% of the Turkish GDP (Felbermayr, Heid, & Lehwald, 
2013, pp. 28–30, 41; Felbermayr, Larch, Flach, Yalcin, & Benz, 2013, pp. 6–7). Experts have argued 
for the necessity of Ankara’s participation in the TTIP process to prevent any economic downsides as 
well as to improve turbulent political relations with Atlantic allies (e.g., Aran, 2015, pp. 3–5; Kaleagasi 
& Ornarli, 2013; Kirisci, 2013, pp. 17–18). Lobbying Washington, DC and EU capitals, Turkish 
cabinet members sporadically threatened that Ankara would unilaterally suspend the Customs Union 
or consider switching it to a more flexible FTA if Turkey was not granted a seat at the TTIP negotiation 
table (Hurriyet Daily News, 28 March 2013, 28 October 2013; Cetingulec, 2014). 
Neither Washington nor Brussels has acquiesced to the Turkish bid of association with the TTIP 
process, at least during bilateral negotiations, which have already proven sophisticated enough with 
several technical and politically sensitive issues. The policy debate has continued elaborating upon 
how to re-engage Turkey with emerging transatlantic commercial architecture following the striking 
of a potential TTIP deal. Turkish officials suggested the injection of specific provisions into the final 
TTIP draft for “docking” Turkey, which would apply the pact’s obligations “automatically” to the EU’s 
Customs Union partners (Hurriyet Daily News, 16 May 2014, 5 November 2014). Some experts have 
proposed the launch of “TTIP plus 3” talks after reaching a transatlantic agreement so as to extend the 
pact to Turkey as well as Mexico and Canada (Akman, 2013, pp. 14–15; Kirisci, 2015). Meanwhile 
the United States and European governments have opened new consultation channels to turn Ankara’s 
enthusiasm into a more realistic and fruitful reform agenda. As a prerequisite to Turkey’s association 
with TTIP, the Americans called upon Ankara to take steps to address specific problems pertinent to 
the Turkish intellectual property rights (IPRs) regime, commercial offsets, licensing and certification 
processes, and transparency and discrimination problems in the government procurement system 
(D€unya, 8 September 2014; Today’s Zaman, 2 October 2014). Similarly, Brussels put forth the 
“modernisation” of the Customs Union as a necessary step to address the aforementioned 
“asymmetries” created by its design and to expand its purview from industrial products to also include 
farming, services and government procurement. Turkish–European consultations have led to a mutual 
understanding in May 2015 to initiate formal modernisation talks in 2017 (Hurriyet Daily News, 12 
May 2015; D€unya, 25 October 2016). In addition, both Europeans and Americans continued to 
encourage Ankara to accede to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) and 
effectively participate in the ongoing Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) talks in Geneva.1 
The policy debate on TTIP and Turkey has so far intensively focused on the question of “how,” 
rather than “why” Ankara should/would join a potential transatlantic commercial pact. Existing 
                                                          
1 As a plurilateral initiative to liberalise barriers to global trade in services, the TiSA negotiations started in Geneva in 2012 
between 23 parties that constitute the group of “Really Goods Friends of Services” comprising among others the United States, 
EU and Turkey. 
 accounts do not provide a satisfactory rationale that would economically justify a “TTIP plus Turkey” 
scenario vis-a-vis alternative policy trajectories. Specifically, studies claim Turkey’s association with 
a transatlantic FTA as something beneficial, yet mostly without substantiating this argument with a 
comprehensive quantitative or qualitative assessment. Although there are a few impact studies using 
quantitative modelling approaches, these reports generally do not account for multiple critical 
implications of the “deep integration” agenda that underlie TTIP and other contemporary preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs). 2  Utilising insights from the emerging literature on deep integration 
agreements, this paper intends to provide an encompassing understanding of potential implications for 
Turkey of specific issues on the transatlantic agenda with their associated compliance and adjustment 
costs, and policy repercussions. By mapping out the agenda items in market access, regulatory matters 
and rules, which will require Turkish action, the paper lays out potential benefits and trade-offs that 
the Turkish economy and policies are likely to encounter in a “TTIP plus Turkey” scenario in 
comparison with the status quo, that is, a “baseline scenario” (of not associating Turkey with a TTIP). 
Such an approach also provides clues about the implications of more imminent and likely but less 
comprehensive re-engagement mechanisms regardless of a factual materialisation of a “TTIP plus 
Turkey,” including a modernised customs union agreement, conclusion of TiSA and Turkey’s 
accession into the GPA. 
The remainder of the paper will map out issues on the TTIP agenda that are critical to Turkish 
industries and the government following a short summary of existing knowledge of the impact of deep 
integration PTAs. It will then explore the implications of different scenarios for Turkey by evaluating 
statistical data and findings of quantitative modelling endeavours, and qualitatively comparing 
relevant Turkish standards and emerging joint transatlantic norms. 
2 | ANALYSING THE IMPACT OF DEEP INTEGRATION PTAs 
Standard economic theories envisage PTAs as instruments utilised to neutralise effects of beggar-thy-
neighbour policies placed by governments to protect uncompetitive industries at a cost of distorting 
international trade (Baldwin, 2009, 2011). Dismantling of trade barriers such as tariffs following the 
PTA will spur particular static (one-off) and/or dynamic (longer term) welfare effects thanks to 
improved terms of trade and more efficient allocation of resources. Static effects include trade creation 
and trade diversion. Trade creation occurs between PTA parties because of the displacement of less 
efficient production in favour of more efficient partner country production. Trade diversion takes place 
as trade between each participant and excluded countries deviate into PTA partners following the deal 
by displacing more efficient non-partner imports with less efficient production in PTA partner(s). The 
magnitude of these two opposing effects will determine the aggregate static impacts which vary from 
one deal to another. PTAs also lead to certain dynamic or growth effects that emerge in the longer 
term entailing more substantive and pervasive implications critical for developing countries such as a 
reallocation of economic resources, industrial restructuring and changes to economic efficiency. 
Overall, PTAs pave the way for some domestic winners but also losers as they incur adjustment costs 
                                                          
2 Following the terminology adopted by the WTO Secretariat, the generic term “PTA” in the paper refers to all reciprocal 
preferential agreements at regional, bilateral and plurilateral levels that cover free trade agreements and customs unions (WTO, 
2012, p. 44). 
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to uncompetitive firms and industries mostly in the form of diminishing production, exits of firms 
from the market and rising unemployment (see Porto & Hoekman, 2010). 
The economic impact of PTAs is usually analysed through studying trade and price linkages 
between markets by taking account of several factual or calibrated parameters. Computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models are the most frequently applied tool for an “ex-ante” assessment of a 
forthcoming agreement (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, pp. 20–24). CGE models quantify 
economic implications of a deal by comparing the national welfare in the status quo market 
equilibrium with the post-PTA economic equilibrium calculated for a projected year. For instance, 
according to the Ifo analysts’ study mentioned above, a comprehensive TTIP that covers reduction of 
both tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) would in the long run lead to a GDP growth of 13.38% and 
4.68% for the USA and Germany, respectively (Felbermayr, Larch, et al., 2013, p. 6). ECPR experts 
generated a more realistic assessment suggesting that an “ambitious” TTIP scenario would boost EU 
GDP by 0.48% and US GDP by 0.39% which amount to EUR 119 billion growth to the EU’s national 
income, and EUR 95 billion expansion to the US GDP by 2027 (Francois, Manchin, Norberg, Pindyuk, 
& Tomberger, 2013, pp. 46–47, 50–51). 
The large difference between these two forecasts is not only because of methodological differences 
but also indicative of the difficulty to quantify the effects of PTAs. It also hints the fact that CGE 
models are imperfect instruments prone to several deficiencies. 3  Standard quantitative models 
encounter greater problems that affect the validity of results since the focus of PTAs has recently 
shifted from border barriers to NTBs and rules by concerning themselves not only with trade of goods 
but also investment and service flows. Suffice it to note that a particularly challenging task is to 
quantify the impact of the elimination of NTBs, which are redundant and costly regulations such as 
divergent standards, conformity measures, and testing and certification requirements installed for 
purposes of environmental protection, consumer and food safety etc. (Ecorys, 2009). As opposed to 
“shallow integration” deals, which exclusively address conventional border barriers “deep 
integration,” PTAs increasingly contain “WTO-plus” rules for eliminating NTBs and setting standards 
in areas such as competition policy, investment protection, labour and environmental conditions etc. 
(Horn, Mavroidis, & Sapir, 2010; WTO, 2012, pp. 128–131). In this regard, it becomes particularly 
problematic to capture the interaction between the regulatory agenda set by new PTAs and preference 
creation versus trade diversion dynamics outlined above. Since there is no thumb rule to detect and 
compare the sophistication of the local regulatory environment with PTA commitments, it is 
particularly hard to measure the “depth” of a PTA, hence its market-opening and standards-converging 
effects (Kim, 2015, p. 372). In fact, depending on the design of a PTA, the development level and 
regulatory structure of the parties and outsiders, the regulatory agenda may have both positive and 
negative implications. 
On the upside, some PTA rules, which may be distinguished as “pro-competitive” following in the 
dichotomy of Patrick Messerlin (2008, p. 5), may engender positive spillovers for the PTA participants 
and outsiders. For example, the rules that remove domestic or cross-border anticompetitive practices, 
facilitate trade and improve competition policy are capable of curtailing transaction costs and 
enhancing domestic competition. Furthermore, the convergence of regulatory systems is likely to 
                                                          
3  CGE models are criticised for their inability to fully account for the time dimension and dynamic effects of PTAs, 
oversensitivety to the presence and utilisation of economic data, and simplistic theoretical assumptions they are built upon, 
which may hardly hold in real world (Plummer et al., 2010, p. 23). 
 improve trade conditions between exporters of parties and nonparties, and among third parties that 
have adopted standards set by a pact (Chauffour & Maur, 2011b, pp. 26–27; Francois et al., 2013, pp. 
28–29; Hoekman & Mavroidis, 2015, pp. 8–10). Specifically, enterprises, which previously had to 
comply with different norms in trading with PTA parties, do face lower transaction costs following 
the deal. In addition to such direct impact, a PTA may also induce certain indirect spillovers that derive 
from the adoption of new collective standards by non-parties. Nonetheless, as World Trade Institute 
scholars proclaim “estimated spill-overs [...] are [...] even more [speculative] than standard trade 
policy modelling” (Cottier et al., 2014, p. 7). Although it is 
 
TABLE 1 Composition of the changes in GDP after TTIP (in percent, 2027 benchmark with 20% direct spillovers) 
Stemming from the liberalisation of 
 
 Total b. Total c. Total 
(a + b + NTBs NTBs d. Direct e. Indirect c + d + e) a. 




Less ambitiousa TTIP 
European Union 0.27 0.1 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 
United States 0.21 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.03 0 0.01 
Total other countries 0.07       
Ambitious TTIP        
European Union 0.48 0.11 0.26 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.05 
United States 0.39 0.04 0.23 0.06 0.06 0 0.03 
Total other countries 0.14       
Note: aThe less ambitious scenario envisages 98% reduction of tariffs, 10% cut in NTB related costs, and removal of 25% of procurement 
NTBs, whereas ambitious scenario models 100% elimination of tariffs, 25% cut in NTB driven costs, and 50% reduction of procurement 
barriers.Source: Francois et al. (2013, pp. 46, 82). 
hard to quantify and model those spillovers, completely disregarded by some scholars (e.g., 
Felbermayr, Heid, et al., 2013; Felbermayr, Larch, et al., 2013), Francois et al. (2013 see Table 1), 
suggest that regulatory spillovers are likely to constitute not a negligible fragment of total welfare 
impact of a TTIP (i.e., 0.09 of 0.48% GDP growth for the EU, and 0.06 of 0.39% GDP growth for the 
USA in the ambitious scenario). 
On the flipside, the regulatory agenda may also induce particular disadvantages or “negative 
spillovers” also overlooked in most quantitative modelling studies (Ciuriak & Singh, 2015, p. 3; 
Narayanan, Ciuriak, & Singh, 2015, pp. 2–3). Messerlin distinguishes PTA rules that redesign market 
conditions as “norm-setting.” These rules set standards for technical, safety and other commercial and 
non-commercial purposes. Yet they may consequently inhibit market competition and charge higher 
costs than expected economic benefits especially for developing countries (Messerlin, 2008, p. 5). For 
example, higher standards for environmental protection, labour and/or IPRs embraced by PTA 
partners as well as countries that are in intensive commercial interaction with the partners may prove 
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cumbersome because of needed industrial as well as executive, legislative and judiciary capacities to 
comply (Chauffour & Maur, 2011a; Stoler, 2011, pp. 229–231). On the other hand, in some issue areas 
such as state-owned enterprises (SOEs), non-compliance with higher PTA standards may turn to an 
advantage for the third parties, which enjoy and strategically utilise a greater “policy space” to build 
and maintain a competitive edge in international market vis-a-vis PTA partners (Ciuriak & Singh, 
2015, pp. 8–9). In this respect, developing countries are in a position to assess a PTA also from a 
policy perspective, evaluate potential impact of rules in specific domains upon domestic reform 
agenda and ensure that sufficient autonomy is in place to pursue legitimate objectives such as poverty 
alleviation and transfer of technology (Chauffour & Maur, 2011b, pp. 23, 34; Hoekman, 2011, pp. 95–
98, 102–104; Hoekman, Mattoo, & Sapir, 2007, pp. 387–389). 
Negative trade diversion impact of PTAs for the third parties can be alleviated further if parties 
adopt a methodology of “open regionalism,” by embracing nondiscrimination through MFN-based 
liberalisation of NTBs and the use liberalised rules of origin (RoO) (Chauffour & Maur, 2011a, pp. 
2–3; Cottier et al., 2014, p. 6, 45). Liberalising RoO would particularly prevent segmentation of the 
PTA market from world markets by ensuring the feasibility of global sourcing of intermediate inputs 
(Ciuriak, 2014, pp. 6–8; Ciuriak & Singh, 2015, p. 5). 
3 | TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) 
The TTIP negotiations follow a mandate set by the High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth 
(HLWG) made of high-level officials from the United States and Europe (HLWG, 2013). Issues on 
the agenda can be listed under three somehow overlapping headings: market access, regulatory matters 
and rules. Accounting for the negotiation dynamics, one can further divide the issues into six clusters 
(shown in rows on Table 2) within which initial trade-offs to take place, to be followed by trade-offs 
between clusters (Messerlin, 2014, p. 6). 
3.1 | Market access 
Expected welfare gains from TTIP will derive from additional access of transatlantic partners to each 
other’s goods, services and government procurement markets. The area of goods promises the largest 
gains that would stem from trade and investment to be created by the removal of several TABLE 2 The 
map of TTIP negotiation agenda 
Market access Regulatory matters Rules 
Goods 
 Industrial goods Tariffs Technical barriers to trade IPRs: patents (pharma, chemicals) 




 Agri-food  Tariffs 
Rules of origin 
Tariff-rate quotas 
TTIP safeguards 
 Sanitary & phytosanitary 
measures 
 IPRs: geographical indications 
Services Scope Regulatory barriers IPRs: copyright protection 
 TTIP safeguards Data protection 
Investment  Coverage  Regulatory barriers  Dispute settlement (ISDS?) 
Public procurement Coverage   
Rules  Trade facilitation  Environment  Labour standards 
  State-owned Enterprises  Small & medium firms  Competition policy 
  Localisation barriers    Transparency 
  Raw materials & energy    Institutional rules (dispute 
settlement etc.) 
Source: Adopted and revised from Messerlin (2014, p. 6). 
TABLE 3 Barriers to trade in goods and services compared 
Simple average MFN applied tariff rates for 2014 
(%) 
 Tariff equivalents of commercial 
 Non-agriculture Agriculture Total services barriers (%)a 
Turkey 5.4 42.2 10.7 43.9 
EU 4.2 12.2 5.3 8.5 
USA 3.2 5.1 3.5 8.9 
Source: World Tariff Profiles (WTO et al., 2015). aCalculations 
of Haufbauer et al., 2012: 17. 
barriers set at multiple levels in various sectors. Despite higher duties in some product categories such 
as motor vehicles, parts and components, processed food sector, and to some extent in agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries, applied tariff rates in industrial goods are generally at low levels and more than 
half of bilateral trade is carried out duty-free (Francois et al., 2013, pp. 14–15; see Table 3). In addition, 
Patrick Messerlin contends that ensuring gains from tariff liberalisation will require liberalised RoO, 
which seem unlikely given the difficulty of compromising two distinct systems (Messerlin, 2014, p. 
7). The elimination of NTBs is likely to bring more substantial benefits than tariffs in the area of goods 
trade. 
In the realm of trade in services, negotiators will target NTBs that hamper different modes of 
international supply of service products. HLWG recommended the negotiators to commit to the 
highest levels of opening recorded in recent European and American FTAs (HLWG, 2013, pp. 3– 5). 
Taking account of liberal nature of services on both sides and limited actual services opening in those 
past deals, Cottier et al. (2014, pp. 8, 85–86) contend that TTIP would add little to opening transatlantic 
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markets.4 Impediments in terms of tariff equivalents are higher in the US market especially in financial 
and insurance services whereas European barriers are greater in communication, other business, 
construction and cultural services (see Figure 1). Moreover, the two sides have politically sensitive 
areas that will likely be exempt from any potential opening such as financial services, maritime and 
perhaps also air transport for the Americans, and audio-visual services for Europeans (Messerlin, 
2015, pp. 10–11; Schott & Cimino, 2013, pp. 15–16). Plus, cross-border transfer of data by US 
corporations is an ongoing concern for Europeans and might affect bargaining in services, which also 
cover e-commerce, digital products, e-signatures, online consumer protection and access to and use of 
the Internet (Lester, 2014, p. 2). Aside from the scope, the negotiators will have to reconcile past 
differences on the methodology of scheduling commitments probably upon a “hybrid” method that 
will synthesise positive and negative list approaches (Schott & Cimino, 2013, p. 16). 
Investment is another domain where corporations on both sides expect the removal of remaining 
obstacles to business establishment and operations. If the two sides can remove foreign direct 
investment (FDI) related regulatory barriers under a TTIP, this will lead more EU and US corporations 
to open affiliates and create additional employment on the other side. The investment impact of TTIP 
on third parties will be contingent upon the pattern of their economic ties with TTIP partners (Francois 
et al., 2013, pp. 92–93). Beside FDI liberalisation, transatlantic business community desires higher 
standards of investment protection in line with the rules of recent US PTAs and Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) (e.g., Donnelly, 2013). However, the fate of the proposed 
 
 EU NTBs Against USA  USA NTBs Against EU 
FIGURE 1 Non-tariff barriers to trade in the US and EU 
Source: Ecorys (2009) 
                                                          
4 Unless indicated otherwise this section rests in the EU and US priorities explained in respective websites: http://ec.europa.e 
u/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/ and https://ustr.gov/ttip (accessed 30 September 2016). 
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 Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) tribunal is linked with the reconciliation of concerns of 
NGOs especially in Europe about potential negative social impact of enhanced investment protection 
and enforcement (EC, 2015b). 
Government procurement is the last market access area significant mostly for the Europeans who 
seek dismantling discriminatory US restrictions enacted especially since the 2009 “Buy American” 
legislation (Schott & Cimino, 2013, pp. 16–17). The final outcome will be determined by the US 
willingness to open up its markets especially at subfederal level beyond commitments granted under 
the WTO GPA (Schott & Cimino, 2013, p. 17). The implications for partners and outsiders will depend 
on TTIP provisions on bidding thresholds and coverage as well as the impact of reciprocal 
liberalisation upon market access in particular good and service sectors. 
3.2 | Regulatory matters 
In addition to regulatory barriers in services, transatlantic negotiators have been working on horizontal 
and sector-specific technical barriers to trade (TBT) in goods affecting manufacturing industries, and 
regulations on food safety, animal and plant health in the agri-food sector (i.e., Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary [SPS] measures). As seen in Figure 1, highest barriers bringing about additional costs 
for firms are in the food and beverages sector. In manufacturing, automobiles sector encounters higher 
costs up to an extra 25% tariff in addition to applied duties. Other transport equipment, chemicals and 
electrical machinery products face relatively significant NTB-related costs. However, even in the most 
ambitious scenario for a transatlantic FTA the negotiators will be able to address only half of NTBs 
that are “actionable,” that is, NTBs that do not address geographical, cultural and other legitimate 
noncommercial concerns or purposes (Ecorys, 2009, p. xviii). The extent of trade/investment diversion 
as well as of positive spillovers will depend on the methodological approach for transparency, 
regulatory cooperation and convergence which could be through harmonisation, mutual recognition 
or more innovative means (Lester, 2014, p. 2; Messerlin, 2015, pp. 12–15). 
3.3 | Rules 
Transatlantic parties have also engaged in an encompassing standard-setting exercise that goes far 
beyond the WTO and previous PTAs. The success will depend on negotiators’ capability to bridge 
regulatory differences. Inter alia, cooperation on integrating Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) into transatlantic trade as well as on customs and trade facilitation are two domains where 
negotiators would relatively easily reach an accord. Likewise, both Americans and Europeans are 
concerned about “new forms of anticompetitive policy and behaviour” set particularly by emerging 
economies which can be handled through WTO-plus disciplines for competition policy and 
localisation barriers (HLWG, 2013, pp. 5–6). Nevertheless, the parties will need to overcome 
significant disagreements on issues such as cross-border transfer of data, state aid and subsidies, as 
well as SOEs (Schott & Cimino, 2013, pp. 9, 17–18). Despite greater differences in the domain of 
IPRs, TTIP is very likely to create a joint set of stringent rules to protect vested interests in 
knowledgeintensive and artistic industries both in Europe and the United States if negotiators 
exclusively focus on overcoming differences on critical areas addressed in their previous PTAs 
(Messerlin, 2014, p. 10; Schott & Cimino, 2013, pp. 8, 10–11). For instance, both US and EU FTAs 
with Korea contain WTO-plus provisions that extend “effective period” of patent protection for the 
pharma and chemicals industries (Schott & Cimino, 2013, pp. 8, 10–11). However, a prerequisite to a 
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successful outcome might be the resolution of long-standing frictions surrounding geographical 
indications (GIs) (Lester, 2014, p. 2; Schott & Cimino, 2013, pp. 11–13). 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is also likely to set a mixture of legally binding and 
nonbinding commitments to higher labour and environmental standards if negotiators can reconcile 
disagreements (Anuradha, 2011, pp. 409–420; Elliott, 2011, pp. 428–435). While in its past deals, the 
USA subjected these areas to dispute settlement mechanism, the European FTAs contained mostly 
non-binding rules and consultation mechanisms. Potential implications of binding mechanisms for 
developing countries are hard to predict, since there is no record of use of sanctions for the breach of 
social clauses that may require the suspension of concessions or financial compensation (Anuradha, 
2011, pp. 416–420; Elliott, 2011, pp. 435–439). 
4 | TURKEY AND TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIES 
Existing modelling efforts provide an imperfect and partial picture surrounding the impact of a 
transatlantic FTA on Turkey. In a baseline scenario where Turkey remains outside a “tariff-only” 
transatlantic pact, Ifo Institute reports estimate that Turkey’s welfare losses would reach 0.27% of its 
real GDP (and 2.5% loss in a “comprehensive” deal) (Felbermayr, Larch, et al., 2013, pp. 6–7; 
Felbermayr, Heid, et al., 2013, pp. 28–30, 41). For the same “tariff-only” scenario, the World Bank 
predicts a more moderate welfare impact–up to US$160 million annual loss to the Turkish GDP 
(World Bank, 2014a, p. 27). Modelling a “comprehensive” baseline scenario that takes into account 
the removal of NTBs and (direct) positive regulatory spillovers, Turkish Central Bank economists 
suggest a smaller negative impact on Turkey. If Turkey is left out of the deal they project only a 
modest loss (0.19% of Turkish GDP in the long run—around one thirteenth of the Ifo estimate). For a 
comprehensive “TTIP plus Turkey” scenario, the same study predicts that Turkish GDP will expand 
by 3.8% in the long term (Mavus, Oduncu, & G€unes, 2013, pp. 9–10). There is no study taking into 
account of potential negative spillovers of a transatlantic agreement for Turkey. 
With no doubt, the scope and structure of Turkey’s trade and investment ties with the EU and the 
United States will have critical importance in determining potential implications of a transatlantic FTA 
for Turkish economy and policies. Turkey is economically and institutionally more integrated with 
the EU thanks particularly to the existing Customs Union in industrial goods. With the Customs Union, 
Ankara adopted the EU’s Common Commercial Policy, unilateral preferential regime and Common 
External Tariff for industrial products. The treaty also stipulated Turkey to converge its domestic 
regime with the EU’s acquis communautaire in TBT, IPRs and competition policies (Togan, 2015). 
Since the inauguration of the EU accession talks in 2005, the Turkish government has also 
undertaken reforms to align domestic laws and regulations with the acquis in various policy domains. 
However, the pace of reforms has slowed down in the post-2008 crisis era in tandem with the 
government’s initiation of a set of “selective” industrial policies to address specific structural 
challenges (Yilmaz, 2011). These ongoing challenges include large current account deficit, low 
productivity especially in the farming sector, and exports sophistication problem, particularly the 
inability of Turkey to expand the ratio of high-tech products within the national exports basket 
(Akman, 2012, pp. 145–151; Onis & Kutlay, 2013, pp. 1415–1416; World Bank, 2014b, pp. 1– 30). 
The government has embarked upon a set of strategies together with a master plan called Vision 2023, 
 which embraced the goal to make Turkey one of the top 10 economies worldwide by expanding GDP 
from US$790 billion (in 2012) to US$2 trillion by the year 2023, the centennial of the Turkish 
Republic (AKP, 2012, p. 54). These strategies encompassed government intervention to the market 
through state supports and incentives, localisation requirements and government procurement as well 
as trade policies. Inspired from the success of BRICs and other catch-up economies Turkish industrial 
policies have in fact been directed towards a “neo-developmentalist” route within the policy space 
remaining from international commitments, yet in contradiction with the emerging transatlantic 
commercial agenda, to be discussed later (Onis & Kutlay, 2013, pp. 1420–1423; Yilmaz, 2011). 
As a consequence of intensive economic integration, the EU has become Turkey’s top trading 
partner whereas Turkey stands the fifth biggest export market of the Union. Thanks to market opening 
and reforms to the business environment following the Customs Union, the structure of the Turkish 
manufacturing base and exports have transformed from one producing heavily labourintensive and 
low technology products to an economy led by capital-intensive and medium technology products 
(WTO, 2016a, pp. 12, 20–21). Currently, Turkish manufacturing exports to the world are spearheaded 
by vehicle and transport products, followed by clothing, metal products, chemicals and machinery. In 
turn, Turkey imports mineral fuels, chemicals, machinery and automotive products as well as iron and 
steel. According to the WTO, intermediaries made up 46.3% of Turkish merchandise exports and 55.3 
of the total imports in 2014. This signifies intensive intra-industry trade and investment links 
especially with Europe that have paved the way for the integration of Turkish firms with global value 
chains in major industries such as motor vehicles, textiles and apparel, and agri-food (World Bank, 
2014a, p. 9, 2014b, pp. 40–52). Indeed, Turkish– EU trade is quite diversified and made up of a two-
way exchange in various intermediary and finished goods (See Table 4). In manufacturing, Turkey 
predominantly exports automotive, clothing and machinery items, and imports chemicals, machinery 
and automotive products. In agriculture, Turkey registers a surplus with its exports of mostly dried, 
fresh and processed fruits and vegetables (amounting to US$5.6 billion in 2014) in exchange for 
European oil seeds, food preparations, 
TABLE 4 Major products in Turkey’s trade with the European Union (2014) 













87 Vehicles other than railway or 
tramway rolling-stock, and 
parts and accessories thereof 
14,344 84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery 
and mechanical appliances; parts 
thereof 
17,901 
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, 
machinery and mechanical 
appliances; parts thereof 
7,765 87 Vehicles other than railway or 
tramway rolling-stock, and parts and 
accessories thereof 
13,120 
61 Articles of apparel and 7,605 85 Electrical machinery and equipment 7,981 clothing 
accessories, knitted and parts thereof; sound recorders 
 or crocheted and reproducers, television image 
and sound recorders and 
reproducers, and parts and 
accessories of such articles 
12 
 
85 Electrical machinery and 
equipment and parts thereof; 
sound recorders and 
reproducers, television image 
and sound recorders and 
reproducers, and parts and 
accessories of such articles 
5,355 27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and 
products of their distillation; 
bituminous substances; mineral 
waxes 
7,577 
62 Articles of apparel and 
clothing accessories, not 
knitted or crocheted 
4,608 72 Iron and steel 7,243 
73 Articles of iron or steel 2,515 39 Plastics and articles thereof 6,570 
39 Plastics and articles thereof 2,500 30 Pharmaceutical products 3,390 
8 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of 
citrus fruit or melons 
2,158 90 Optical, photographic, 
cinematographic, measuring, 
checking, precision, medical or 
surgical instruments and apparatus; 
parts and accessories thereof 
3,035 
40 Rubber and articles thereof 1,663 29 Organic chemicals 2,285 
72 Iron and steel 1,620 88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 1,823 
63 Other made up textile articles; 
sets; worn clothing and worn 
textile articles; rags 
1,519 48 Paper and paperboard; articles of 
paper pulp, of paper or of 
paperboard 
1,756 
76 Aluminium and articles thereof 1,461 73 Articles of iron or steel 1,492 
20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, 
nuts or other parts of plants 
1,453 74 Copper and articles thereof 1,382 
52 Cotton 1,047 38 Miscellaneous chemical products 1,377 
(Continues) 
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94 Furniture; bedding, 
mattresses, mattress 
supports, cushions and 
similar stuffed furnishings; 
lamps and lighting fittings, 
not elsewhere specified or 
included; illuminated signs, 
illuminated name-plates and 
the like; prefabricated 
buildings 
1,000 71 Natural or cultured pearls, 
precious or semi-precious stones, 
precious metals, metals clad with 
precious metal, and articles 
thereof; imitation jewellery; coin 
1,376 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and 
products of their distillation; 
bituminous substances; 
mineral waxes 
969 40 Rubber and articles thereof 1,270 
 
74 Copper and articles thereof 831 32 Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins 
and their derivatives; dyes, 
pigments and other colouring 
matter; paints and varnishes; putty 
and other mastics; inks 
1,217 
54 Man-made filaments; strip and 
the like of man-made textile 
materials 
819 33 Essential oils and resinoids; 
perfumery, cosmetic or toilet 
preparations 
1,168 
60 Knitted or crocheted fabrics 788 62 Articles of apparel and clothing 706 
accessories, not knitted or crocheted 
71 Natural or cultured pearls, 
precious or semi-precious 
stones, precious metals, metals 
clad with precious metal, and 
articles thereof; imitation 
jewellery; coin 
655 34 Soap, organic surface-active agents, 
washing preparations, lubricating 
preparations, artificial waxes, 
prepared waxes, polishing or 
scouring preparations, candles and 
similar articles, modelling pastes, 
dental waxes and dental 
preparations with a basis of plaster 
655 
Source: UN Comtrade 
manufactured tobacco, cattle and grains (US$2.7 billion). The Turkish Central Bank data indicate that 
the EU has also been the primary source of FDI responsible for 70% of inflows to Turkey between 
2004 and 2014. 
Turkey’s economic ties with the United States have been less diverse and outweighed by 
historically strong security and political relations. Bilateral relations suffer deep-rooted challenges 
affecting especially Turkish exports to the United States and US FDI flows into Turkey (SGA, 
2012).5Over the past decade, US–Turkish trade has grown at a slower pace than trade of the two parties 
with the world. The share of the United States within Turkey’s goods exports has experienced a decline 
between 2000 and 2014 from 11% to 4% at the expense of increasing Turkish imports and trade deficit 
(see Figure 2). The USA was the sixth exports and the fourth imports partner of 
                                                          
5 In 2012 Turkey exported 1,095 nonagricultural and 136 agricultural products to the EU; and 418 non-agricultural and 51 farm 
products to the USA. In terms of 6-digit HS classification these products constituted 95% of bilateral trade with each party 





FIGURE 2 Trade with the USA and EU as share of Turkey’s total trade 
Source: UN Comtrade 
TABLE 5 Major products in Turkey’s trade with the United States (2014) 
Turkey’s exports to the 
United States 
 Turkey’s imports from the 
United States 
 



















































72 Iron and steel 1,555 72 Iron and steel 1,141 
88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts 
thereof 
1,398 84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery 
and mechanical appliances; parts 
thereof 
711 
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, 1,259 87 Vehicles other than railway or 458 machinery 
and mechanical tramway rollingstock, and parts appliances; parts thereof and 
accessories thereof 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and 
products of their distillation; 
bituminous substances; mineral 
waxes 
1,075 68 Articles of stone, plaster, cement, 
asbestos, mica or similar materials 
346 
52 Cotton 918 73 Articles of iron or steel 341 
90 Optical, photographic, 
cinematographic, measuring, 
checking, precision, medical or 
surgical instruments and 
apparatus; parts and accessories 
thereof 
833 57 Carpets and other textile floor 
coverings 
272 
30 Pharmaceutical products 598 88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts 
thereof 
254 
39 Plastics and articles thereof 532 63 Other made up textile articles; 
sets; worn clothing and worn 
textile articles; rags 
226 
29 Organic chemicals 497 24 Tobacco and manufactured 189 
tobacco substitutes 
85 Electrical machinery and 
equipment and parts thereof; 
sound recorders and reproducers, 
television image and sound 
recorders and reproducers, and 
parts and accessories of such 
articles 
484 71 Natural or cultured pearls, precious 
or semiprecious stones, precious 
metals, metals clad with precious 
metal, and articles thereof; 
imitation jewellery; coin 
153 
48 Paper and paperboard; articles of 
paper pulp, of paper or of 
paperboard 
322 55 Man-made staple fibres 130 
87 Vehicles other than railway or 
tramway rolling-stock, and parts 
and accessories thereof 
312 61 Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories, knitted or crocheted 
123 
(Continues) 
TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Turkey’s exports to the 
United States 

















12 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; 
miscellaneous grains, seeds and 
fruit; industrial or medicinal 
plants; straw and fodder 
294 74 Copper and articles thereof 117 
23 Residues and waste from the food 
industries; prepared 
animal fodder 
207 62 Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories, not knitted or crocheted 
114 
38 Miscellaneous chemical products 197 20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts 
or other parts of plants 
113 
99 Commodities not specified 
according to kind 
173 8 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus 
fruit or melons 
111 
47 Pulp of wood or of other fibrous 
cellulosic material; recovered 
(waste and scrap) paper or 
paperboard 
170 93 Arms and ammunition; parts and 
accessories thereof 
109 
8 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus 
fruit or melons 
145 40 Rubber and articles thereof 103 
40 Rubber and articles thereof 136 27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and 102 
products of their distillation; 
bituminous substances; 
mineral waxes 
71 Natural or cultured pearls, 
precious or semi-precious stones, 
precious metals, metals clad with 
precious metal, and articles 
thereof; imitation jewellery; coin 
128 39 Plastics and articles thereof 83 
Source: UN Comtrade 
Turkey in 2014. Turkey’s share in US trade is quite negligible, as it ranks number 26 among America’s 
exports destinations and number 38 in its imports markets. 
It is unquestionable that Turkish exporters, especially SMEs are unable to compete in the US 
market because they fail to meet American market requirements, particularly higher consumer 
expectations in terms of quality and customisation of products, as well as because of logistic and 
distribution costs, hard to meet without greater scale in exports. More importantly, Turkish exports to 
the US market are made up of labour and capital-intensive products, which do not match the US 
imports portfolio that is raw material and research intensive (i.e., petroleum and machinery) 
(McKinsey and Company, 2009; SGA, 2012, p. 15). Turkey exports (mostly final) products of iron 
and steel, passenger vehicles, textiles and clothing, machinery and building materials (See Table 5). 
It imports American intermediate goods (scrap iron and steel, chemicals, transport equipment), some 
high value-added products (aircraft, machinery and defence equipment) and mineral fuels and coal. In 
contrast to its trade with the EU, Turkey gives a growing deficit in its farming (as well as 
manufacturing) trade with the United States. Turkish firms export tobacco, confectionery, olive oil 
and fractions as well as dried fruits and vegetables (US$675 million in62014). In turn Turkey imports 
                                                          
6 Model BIT covers an extended scope of investment, stringent rules on host government performance requirements, disciplines 
on SOEs, and encompassing transparency obligations for publication of laws and regulations, policy decisions regarding 
 nuts as well as cotton and soybeans, which are crucial inputs to Turkish textile and livestock sectors 
(US$1 billion). In this respect, diminishing Turkey–US trade and growing trade deficit are structural 
challenges that require a more sophisticated export promotion strategy on Turkey’s part that would 
address scale, quality and consumer taste issues as well as logistics and product-mismatch problems 
(McKinsey and Company, 2009; SGA, 2012). As will be discussed below the Turkish association with 
a TTIP (or negotiating a Turkish–US FTA) may not become the needed shot in the arm for Turkey’s 
US-bound exports as much as it boosts imports unless accompanied with supplementary measures. 
Part of the reason for less developed trade ties of Turkey with the USA is also because of less 
intensive investment linkages. According to Boston Consulting Group, Turkey has been 
“underinvested” by American multinationals and is far from attracting its “fair share” from US FDI 
outflows (Boston Consulting Group, 2011). Over the last 10 years, American investments in Turkey 
have reached an accumulated amount of US$9 billion which constituted less than 6% of total average 
annual inflows. US businesses have ongoing concerns about the Turkish business environment owing 
to unpredictable policy decisions, sporadic changes to the regulations and legal system, judicial system 
inefficiency, red tape, high and inconsistent rates of taxes (Boston Consulting Group, 2011; USCS, 
2014, p. 77). A viable policy option to relieve some of those concerns might be to upgrade the US–
Turkey Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) which was signed in 1985 along the lines of the first 
generation American BITs. Contemporary (fourth generation) US deals designed upon the “2012 
Model BIT” provide a larger scope and higher standards of protection.7 Nevertheless, prior American 
attempts to update the agreement with Turkey have not been productive.7 
Lastly, services trade is an under-explored area with regard to its part in Turkey’s relations with the 
transatlantic economies. According to the WTO data for trade in value-added, services constituted 
65% of Turkish GDP, 54% of added value of total goods exports and 38% value of Turkish exports 
of manufactures in 2014. The same year Turkish services exports amounted to US$50 billion almost 
twice of Turkey’s imports from the world (i.e., US$23 billion). The Turkish exports have specialised 
in domains typical for middle-income countries, such as transport and tourism (which made up 88% 
of Turkish services exports in 2014), but Turkey failed to build up satisfactory capacity in more 
sophisticated areas such as financial, IT or professional services (World Bank, 2014b, pp. 55–56). On 
the other hand, major service categories imported in 2013 included transportation services (especially 
maritime and road freight) of US$9.5 billion value followed by travel (US$4.8 billion), other business 
services (US$2.56 billion), insurance (US$1.75 billion), government (US$1.7 billion) and financial 
services (US$1.3 billion). As in trade in goods, Europe has also been the leading trade partner of 
Turkey in services with a Turkish surplus thanks largely to tourism.8 
                                                          
investment and arbitration proceedings. See https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP% 
20Meeting.pdf (accessed 1 September 2016). 
7 According to a confidential cable from the US Embassy in Ankara to Washington DC dated August 13, 2008 released by 
Wikileaks previous US attempts failed because of the unwillingness of Turkish government officials to undertake additional 
commitments https://www.wikileaks.net/cable/2008/08/08ANKARA1450.html (accessed 1 September 2016). 
8 The European Commission (EC) indicates that in 2013 Turkey exported EUR 15.4 billion value of services to the EU in turn 





Scenario 1: Tariff-only 
Scenario 2: Tariff + Moderate NTB Reduction (5 Per Cent Cost Reduction in Service Barriers, 2 Per Cent 
Reduction in Other Sectors) 
Scenario 3: Tariff + Comprehensive NTB Reduction (5% Cost Reduction in All Sectors) 
Scenario 4: Tariff + Comprehensive NTB Reduction + Direct Spillover Effects (20%) 
FIGURE 3 Impact of TTIP on Turkish real GDP and exports 
Source: Mavus et al. (2013) 
5 | TURKEY AND THE TRANSATLANTIC MARKET ACCESS 
AGENDA 
The structure of remaining tariffs and NTBs affecting Turkey’s trade with transatlantic parties will 
determine the potential economic benefits of TTIP. Starting with the market access agenda of TTIP 
for goods, tariffs remain a significant issue area as much as NTBs with respect to implications for 
Turkey. 
5.1 | Tariffs 
The majority of Turkish export products enter both US and European markets duty-free thanks largely 
to the Customs Union and the USA’s Generalized System of Preferences programme.9 In case of the 
European market, high tariffs remain an obstacle for Turkish exporters of some products such as pasta, 
olive oil, hazelnuts and confectionery. Tariffs of the United States concern Turkish exporters of 
                                                          
9 Overall, 100% of Turkish exports in non-agriculture goods and around 81% value of farming products already enter European 
markets duty-free. Similarly, 77% of Turkish farm exports and approximately 72% value of nonagriculture exports enter the 
US duty-free (2013 figures as published in WTO et al., 2015, p. 166). 
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Turkey out Turkey in 
 tobacco, alcoholic beverages, textiles, garments, shoes, dairy, fruits and vegetables (MoE, 2015, pp. 
3, 12). On the flipside, Turkish tariffs constitute a significant barrier for both US and European 
exporters of farm products (See Table 3 above). Three-digit tariff peaks cause complaint for the 
exporters of meat, live animals and dairy products to Turkey (WTO et al., 2015, p. 166, WTO, 2016a, 
pp. 53–54). US exporters also complain about high applied duties for fresh and processed fruits, 
vegetables and derivatives, footwear as well as alcoholic beverages and tobacco products (USTR, 
2016a, pp. 426–427). 
The removal of tariffs in a baseline scenario will benefit the US exporters of industrial goods who 
will freely release their products onto the Turkish market via the Customs Union with no need to a 
reciprocal concession to be granted to Turkey’s exporters. In the case of Turkey’s exclusion, studies 
expect negligible or minor impact on Turkish exports irrespective of the level of ambition of the deal 
between the US and the EU. For example, the World Bank study anticipates a modest growth in total 
Turkish exports (0.02% growth) in a tariff-only baseline scenario, with moderate annual gains in most 
product groups but motor vehicles and parts that would register a slight fall (0.75%). Mavus et al. 
(2013) differently suggest that in a tariff-only baseline scenario Turkish exports would register no 
increase but rather a negligible loss, which would get larger if the deal covers NTBs (when positive 
spillovers discounted) (see Figure 3 above). 
On the other hand, both tariff-only and comprehensive “TTIP plus Turkey” scenarios will clearly 
mean Ankara’s granting of significant concessions in terms of tariff cuts (especially in farming) in turn 
for much lower counter tariff concessions from the EU and USA (and no reductions in farm subsidies). 
The World Bank forecasts a modest annual export increase for Turkey in a tariff-only deal. Textiles 
and garment exports are to record an annual increase of more than 4% yet at the expense of 1.5% falls 
in exports of both automotive and vehicle product categories (World Bank, 2014a, p. 102). As outlined 
in Figure 3, Mavus et al. (2013, pp. 9–10) expect Turkey’s association to lead to an expansion to the 
Turkish exports between 1.30 (for tariff-only scenario) and 7% (for “tariff + NTBs” scenarios) 
depending the coverage of the transatlantic deal. In other words, it is very likely that the removal of 
tariffs will boost the Turkish imports especially in farming due to higher Turkish protection whereas 
potential export gains from “TTIP plus Turkey” scenarios rest mostly in the removal of NTBs rather 
than tariffs. 
5.2 | NTBs affecting manufacturing industries 
In manufacturing, TTIP is likely to affect a number of Turkish NTBs falling in the category of TBTs, 
a regulatory domain highly harmonised with the EU’s acquis. Turkey’s import licensing regime seems 
to be the number one outstanding issue to be subject to discipline in case of a Turkish re-engagement 
through TTIP. Import restrictions especially licenses that affect Turkey’s imports of second-hand 
products as well as alcoholic beverages are supposedly in breach of even the CU commitments of 
Turkey (EC, 2015a, p. 34; USCS, 2014, pp. 68–72). The United States is also critical of Ankara’s 
implementation of the EU’s “CE mark” that certifies products’ conformity to European technical 
standards, but that is reportedly applied by Turkish authorities in discrimination of US exports bound 
to Turkey (USCS, 2014, p. 64). Finally, the healthcare sector is where a substantial part of transatlantic 
concerns is placed. A further convergence with the transatlantic standards is likely to erode 
outstanding flexibilities that allow the government to place measures to constrain the budgetary burden 
created by the universal healthcare system. Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certificate 
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requirements, the Turkish public reimbursement system (which undercuts prices of healthcare 
supplies) and insufficient IPR protection for test data of drugs are among problems raised frequently 
by transatlantic governments (WTO, 2016b, pp. 40–41; USTR, 2014b, p. 100). 
On the flipside, Turkey will likely benefit from a TTIP with no need for association if US and EU 
negotiators remove (on an MFN basis) some of outstanding TBTs in the transatlantic marketplace 
which are also critical to Turkish exporters. Any non-discriminatory dismantling of NTBs outlined in 
Figure 1 has a potential to benefit also Turkish export firms which operate in automotive, machinery, 
chemicals and other industries. For the US market, the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database more 
specifically suggest that Turkish suppliers are affected by US business and licensing regulations as 
well as TBTs for energy conservation and labelling standards in machinery, transport and 
telecommunication equipment sectors (also SGA, 2012, pp. 20–21).10 Despite the Customs Union, 
outstanding impediments persist in Europe such as long-lasting licensing procedures for Turkish drugs 
owing to GMP requirements, public safety regulations for chemicals, biocides and cosmetics; and 
sector-specific measures such as Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation, and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH), (MoE, 2015, pp. 14–16). 
5.3 | NTBs affecting the agri-food sector 
In contrast to technical standards, Turkey’s concord with European food safety, veterinary and 
phytosanitary policy is at an early stage (EC, 2015a, pp. 44–45). This fact, disregarded by existing 
studies, will significantly limit expected benefits from market opening in the agri-food sector as it 
concerns both market access conditions of Turkish exporters and Turkey’s imports regime. Owing to 
poorer domestic standards, Turkish exporters face SPS measures as a barrier to access the European 
market for dairy, nuts, fruits, vegetables and poultry products and to the US market for agrifood, 
cosmetic products and medical equipment (MoE, 2015, pp. 5–6, 12–16; World Bank, 2014a, p. 61; 
Milliyet, 18 September 2013). Unless Turkey invests substantively in rural infrastructure to meet 
transatlantic standards in near future, it is unrealistic to expect the realisation of any increases to 
Turkish exports in fruits, vegetables and processed food forecasted by existing studies (e.g., Eruygur, 
2012; van Leeuwen et al., 2011; World Bank, 2014a, pp. 64–66). To meet transatlantic SPS norms, 
Ankara faces a challenge much bigger than the costs it had encountered while implementing the 
Customs Union commitments over the past two decades (estimated as EUR 1 billion in 2009 figures, 
Togan, 2015, p. 44).11 On the imports side, in any mechanism that would further engage Turkey with 
transatlantic economies in farming (e.g., TTIP or modernisation of the Customs Union) Ankara will 
be in a situation to remove outstanding SPS-related measures it had long placed to protect the farming. 
Those measures criticised for noncompliance with international standards do arguably hinder 
particularly meat and animal imports from Europe and the USA (EC, 2015a, p. 45; USTR, 2014a, p. 
87). Overall, existing studies expect the liberalisation of farming to boost Turkish imports of especially 
                                                          
10 Available at http://www.globaltradealert.org/ (accessed 15 September 2016). 
11 According to the World Bank (2010, p. 7) Turkey needs to invest EUR 2 billion to modernise food enterprises in dairy, fish, 
meat and livestock by-products to catch up with European standards. 
 cereals and oilseeds as well as livestock products (especially cattle and bovine meat) in addition to 
creating rural unemployment.12 
5.4 | Barriers to investment and services 
No study has been conducted to evaluate the impact of a transatlantic FTA on FDI flows into/from 
Turkey. Nonetheless, it seems clear that investment creation between the USA and EU may come at 
a cost of diversion of investment flows off the third parties including Turkey. Turkey’s joining TTIP 
or engaging in a flanking agreement with the USA that would cover investment (i.e., a Turkish-US 
FTA or a renewed BIT) may offset potential diversion yet at a cost of removal of remaining NTBs in 
the Turkish market. Despite being a top investment climate reformer within the OECD group, Turkey 
has left in place regulatory barriers especially in service sectors such as maritime and air (0.575 each), 
radio and TV broadcasting, transport (0.383), media (0.2) and natural resource-based (primary) sectors 
(0.013) (0 signifies full openness and 1 represents full closeness of the sector upon regulatory 
restrictiveness indicators of the OECD).13 Turkish NTBs are comparatively higher than restrictions in 
the United States in real estate, accounting and auditing, tertiary (services) sector and business 
services. In case of a re-engagement in the area of investment, Turkey will need to commit to higher 
standards for protecting investors, which will probably be enforced through an ISDS tribunal. 
Other than outstanding barriers to FDI, Turkish services market is not as open as transatlantic 
economies also because of regulatory barriers affecting cross-border services supply. As per 
calculations of Hufbauer, Jensen, and Stephenson (2012, p. 17), average tariff equivalents of 
commercial services barriers in Turkey are on average five times higher than those of the United States 
and the EU (See Table 3). As seen in Figure 4 the impediments in commercial services take shape of 
administrative procedures, exclusivity of rights and Turkish citizenship requirements, and these are 
particularly larger in the area of professional services (i.e., legal, accounting, auditing and other 
categories) where the USA and EU have strong offensive interests (also USTR, 2016a, p. 428). In 
addition, both the USA and EU have offensive interests also in other areas. During the Doha services 
talks, which paved the way for TiSA negotiations in Geneva, both the USA and EU requested 
concessions from Turkey in computer and related services, postal and delivery, telecommunications, 
environmental, financial and energy services. The USA has been a requester also in audio-visual and 
education services, while the EU demanded further opening to the Turkish maritime transport sector 
(Marchetti & Roy, 2013, p. 17). Recent escalation of legal restrictions on the access to Internet in 
Turkey as well as the Turkish privacy regime which constrains cross-border data transfer have also 
been on the American radar (USTR, 2016a, p. 429). 
Given the lack of sufficient data and analysis on Turkey’s trade in services Ankara’s offensive and 
defensive interests can only be sketched by looking into statistics and the Turkish negotiation position 
during Doha/Geneva talks. In addition to tourism and travel services, in which Turkey became the top 
eighth exporter globally in 2013 and 2014 (the EU taken as a single entity), Turkey has also built up 
competitive capacity in the construction industry, the only area where Ankara became a requester 
during the WTO services talks (Marchetti & Roy, 2013, p. 17). According to the data of the Turkish 
                                                          
12 The World Bank estimates that extending the Customs Union obligations to farming will lead up to 3.25% decrease in total 
rural employment by 2018 (World Bank, 2014a, pp. 64–65, 125). 
13 Available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm (accessed 30 September 2016). 
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Ministry of Economy annual project value of Turkey’s contractors increased from US$2.5 billion in 
2002 to US$33 billion in 2013, with a rise from 137 to 406 in the annual number of international 
projects.14 Nevertheless, during the Doha/Geneva talks, the EU and USA have also been requesters in 
construction services, and there is no NTBs identified in the transatlantic markets that the Turkish 
government could seek concessions in the context of a TTIP or TiSA (Marchetti & Roy, 2013, p. 17). 
Turkey has also built up a significant export capacity in personal, cultural and recreational services 
(ranking 3rd globally in 2014), insurance (ranking 10th) and transportation services (ranking 11th) 
(WTO, 2015, pp. 131–145). Turkey may not have a comparative advantage in each of these domains 
vis-a-vis European economies and/or the United States as it has become a net importer of insurance 
and financial services. Furthermore, exemption of audio-visual services from TTIP or TiSA 
negotiations as advocated by Europeans might constrain any potential benefits in personal, cultural 
and recreational services. Still Turkey may leverage a “TTIP plus Turkey” process (in 
 
FIGURE 4 Regulatory barriers to services compared 
Note: The index scores key restrictions on a 5-point scale between 0 indicating “open without restrictions” and 100 that 
represents “completely closed” 
Source: Services Trade Restrictions Database, World Bank 
parallel with the TiSA talks) to alleviate existing visa procedures that restrict the mobility of Turkish 
natural persons (Mode 4) as well as road quotas and transit permit procedures in Europe (World Bank, 
2014a, pp. 50–55, 77–81; MoE, 2015, pp. 8, 17–18). Finally, it should be reiterated that Turkey will 
probably assume new liberalisation commitments at the end of the TiSA talks in Geneva and/or during 
the services talks for the modernisation of the Customs Union with the EU. Therefore, a “TTIP plus 
                                                          
14 Data from the website of the Ministry of Economy http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr (accessed 1 September 2016). 
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 Turkey” scenario per se may not bring about a significant impact on services trade between Turkey 
and Atlantic economies. 
5.5 | Government procurement 
The Turkish public procurement market presents lucrative opportunities for US and EU bidders thanks 
largely to grand infrastructure projects undertaken or projected by the central and local public 
authorities. The Turkish Public Procurement Authority reports that domestic market covered by the 
Public Procurement Law (PPL) amounted to US$46 billion in 2014.15 In fact, foreign bidders are ruled 
out from an actually even broader market due to ongoing derogations and sector-specific exemptions 
from the scope of the PPL (e.g., in military, housing and utilities sectors). High minimum thresholds 
and price advantages that favour local suppliers further extend discrimination against European and 
American suppliers (WTO, 2016a, p. 111; USCS, 2014, pp. 10–11). According to the US government, 
civilian offsets recently introduced to encourage technology transfer do contradict with the WTO’s 
GPA, and as per the EC, these measures breach the EU acquis (USCS, 2014, p. 86; EC, 2015a, pp. 
37–38). Foreign bidders also complain about tender processes for the complexity of requirements, 
lack of transparency and their vulnerability to political influence (USCS, 2014, p. 3, 93). 
In case of the Turkish association with a TTIP, domestic industries will face competition in 
domestic procurement markets but they will also enjoy business opportunities in the transatlantic 
markets. Although transatlantic governments have been pressuring for Turkey’s accession in the GPA, 
Turkish policymakers have long been adamant not to concede to demands for liberalisation of 
domestic regime. Key concerns have been a potential worsening of Turkey’s current account deficit 
and risk of national suppliers’ losing of internal market to foreigners (TOBB, 2013, pp. 2–3). There 
are also Turkish industry representatives who perceive opportunities in international markets, which 
could be tapped if Turkey guarantees reciprocal concessions (TOBB, 2013, pp. 3–4). This unstudied 
argument might particularly be valid for suppliers in internationally well-performing industries like 
construction. GTA reports that US “Buy American” requirements have also harmed Turkish suppliers 
of iron, steel and textiles whereas selected Turkish goods in aerospace industry and biofuel plants have 
been hit by American bail out/state aid measures. The government reports that Turkish procurers face 
barriers also in some EU countries like Italy since public procurement has been out of the scope of the 
Customs Union (MoE, 2015, p. 18). 
As in the case of services, liberalisation and new disciplines on government procurement might 
have positive and negative implications for domestic industries, yet TTIP per se is unlikely to have a 
significant market access impact. This is because the issue is already on the agenda of Customs Union 
modernisation and Turkey has long been under pressure to accede the GPA. Plus, new disciplines in 
this area need to be analysed also for their impact on Turkey’s development policies, discussed below. 
6 | TURKEY AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RULES AGENDA 
The implications of the TTIP rules for Turkey require a multifaceted and comparative assessment of 
Turkish domestic standards and the transatlantic norms in the making, as well as their policy 
                                                          
15 Details available at http://www.ihale.gov.tr/ (accessed 30 September 2016). 
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repercussions. In the Turkish case, two parameters need to be incorporated into the analysis. First, 
Turkey sits in a unique position vis-a-vis most other third parties as it has already harmonised (because 
of the Customs Union), or is in the process of harmonising, a substantial portion of its domestic 
regulatory structure (because of the EU accession). Second, Turkey has adopted a 
“neodevelopmentalist” policy agenda in the post-2008 period with instruments aimed at boosting 
exports, curbing imports and diversifying local manufacturing towards higher technology products.16 
Considering Turkey’s development level and unique position vis-a-vis the EU, the 
“procompetitive” agenda items on the TTIP negotiation table can be listed as competition policy, 
subsidies, trade facilitation and government procurement. As Turkey has already aligned most of its 
domestic legal regime with the EU acquis, new rules in these domains are likely to yield more 
economic benefits to Turkey than compliance costs in the form of enhanced domestic competition and 
efficiency. Yet those benefits need to be assessed together with internal policy implications of 
transatlantic norms which may require amendments to “anti-competitive” regulations and practices. 
The TTIP agenda entails crafting of new pro-competitive disciplines particularly in the context of 
“new forms of anti-competitive policy and behaviour” (i.e., rules on SOEs, localisation barriers and 
competition policy and/or subsidies). 
Those disciplines are likely to be in conflict with a number of domestic measures. Transatlantic 
governments have specifically been critical of Turkish state aid regulations, SOEs (e.g., the Turkish 
Grain Board) and intervention of these entities in prices of wheat and sugar, government’s incentives 
for investors especially in free zones and for producers of renewable energy (EC, 2015a, p. 33, 41, 47; 
USTR, 2016a, p. 428; WTO, 2016b, pp. 35–36, 54, 121, 
140). Besides, the liberalisation of Turkey’s natural gas sector, particularly the privatisation of the 
state-owned pipeline company BOTAS has been up on their agenda (EC, 2015a, p. 33; USTR, 2016a, 
p. 428). Ongoing deficiencies regarding trade facilitation often pronounced by European and US 
governments include Turkey’s weak customs enforcement capacity for IPRs, and misuse of import 
surveillance measures, efficiency and other problems about the modernisation of the customs (EC, 
2015a, pp. 41, 79–80; USCS, 2014, pp. 19–21, 54, 235–237). Finally, transatlantic governments are 
concerned about the 2014 amendments to the Turkish PPL, which introduced an offset instrument by 
creating a mandatory 15% price preference in favour of local bidders to incentivise internal production 
of medium and high technology industrial products (e.g., for medical devices and commercial 
aircrafts) (EC, 2015a, pp. 37–39; USCS, 2014, pp. 79–80; USTR, 2016a, pp. 427–428). Removal of 
this market-distorting measure might yield positive efficiency effects but at a cost of a definite 
shrinking of the policy space utilised for technological upgrade of domestic manufacturing. Since most 
of these complaints stem from outstanding obligations of Turkey because of the Customs Union or 
EU accession process, a “TTIP plus Turkey” scenario will require Turkey to speed up reforms to 
further upgrade national standards to the EU level before the materialisation of a potential 
membership. 
                                                          
16 These instruments were put into effect parallel to an Industrial Strategy Document issued in 2010, the Exports 2023 Strategy 
declaration and a sophisticated investment incentive package launched in 2012 in tandem with an Input Procurement Strategy 
(GITES), which aims to secure sustainable domestic supply of critical inputs and raw materials to Turkish manufacturing (Onis 
& Kutlay, 2013, pp. 1420–1423). 
 On the downsides, “norm-setting” areas that risk imposing higher costs than economic benefits for 
Turkey seem to be labour and environmental standards as well as IPRs and SPS-related rules, 
discussed before. According to Narayanan et al. (2015, p. 16) upper middle-income countries like 
Turkey will encounter modest costs (i.e., negative spillovers) to comply with higher standards set by 
the mega regionals. For a country in economic development level of Turkey the authors expect 1.65% 
increase in real labour costs and 0.16% growth in real capital costs by the year 2030 due to higher 
ecological standards imposed by Trans-Pacific Partnership and TTIP.17 Considering the fact that 
Ankara is already obliged to fulfil a longer to-do list for the EU accession, labour and environmental 
standards might particularly become problematic especially in a “TTIP plus Turkey” scenario that 
would impose more stringent social standards through effective enforcement mechanisms. 
In case of environmental norms, and social policy and employment rules Turkey is “moderately 
prepared” in according with European standards (EC, 2015a, pp. 51, 76). Although Turkey has 
committed to core International Labour Organisation standards there are ongoing problems such as 
the rights of unregistered Turkish working force (34% of total employment); the problems and 
conditions of subcontracted workers; child labour; and gender equality in employment terms (EC, 
2015a, pp. 51–53). In the area of environment, the Europeans are concerned about the exemptions in 
national procedures regarding the Environmental Impact Assessment that supposedly distorts 
competition; and the inadequacy of public participation and access to information and justice, which 
supposedly affects investment disputes pertinent to environment (EC, 2015a, pp. 76–77). The 
European Commission is also closely monitoring Turkey’s contribution on greenhouse gas emission 
reduction targets to 2015 Paris Climate Agreement (EC, 2015a, p. 78). Turkey will need to handle 
some of these challenges, if not all, in case of an association scenario depending on the level and 
nature of transatlantic standards in the making. 
With respect to IPRs, Ankara’s alignment with European standards is at an “advanced” level but 
Turkey has capacity challenges to enforce them. Because of the Customs Union, Ankara embraced 
the EU’s regime on patents, copyrights, GIs etc. as well as WTO-plus disciplines for “data exclusivity” 
against the unfair use of test data of drugs. Nevertheless, American stakeholders are concerned with 
ongoing copyright, online piracy, and counterfeit goods problems, and widespread use of unlicensed 
software in Turkey (USTR, 2016b, p. 56). Ankara has long been on the infamous “Watch List” of the 
Office of the USTR. Likewise, a recent EC report named Turkey as the third most prominent source 
of counterfeit products crossing EU customs (EC, 2013, p. 34). Turkey is expected to legislate a new 
law to bring about deterrent criminal sanctions, and stronger civil, criminal and administrative 
procedures to combat piracy and counterfeiting internally and at the borders (EC, 2015a, p. 40–41; 
USTR, 2016b, p. 56; WTO, 2016b, pp. 44–47, 137). The government also has to enact new laws on 
industrial property and copyrights to catch up with the amendments to the EU regime (EC, 2015a, p. 
40–41). 
In addition to implementation costs, a TTIP-driven IPR agenda is also likely to induce capital costs 
upon firms in industries where IPRs infringed more frequently. Most likely victims are producers of 
counterfeit goods of clothing, perfumes and cosmetics, bags, shoes and watches, and unlicensed 
software users, which reportedly constitute 60% of domestic sectors causing US$504 million value of 
commercial loss to American right-holders (EC, 2013, p. 34; USTR, 2016b, p. 56). The government 
                                                          
17 The study does not mention Turkey but lists Mexico which has an identical per capita income as per the International 
Monetary Fund data. 
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will need to contrast these costs with potential benefits of enhanced and better-enforced standards, 
which may induce innovation and investment for manufacturing higher technology products. 
Against such upsides and downsides of a “TTIP plus Turkey” scenario, Turkey is in an 
advantageous position in a baseline scenario in comparison with other third parties. Enhanced 
regulatory convergence in the transatlantic marketplace will allow the excluded countries to benefit 
from additional market access without joining a TTIP. Francois et al. (2013) expect the direct 
spillovers to diminish trade costs for third countries by 20%. An additional 10% advantage is also 
anticipated as indirect spillovers to the third parties like Switzerland and Turkey which have been 
streamlining their standards with TTIP partners’ (Francois et al., 2013, pp. 28–29). These third 
countries are likely to benefit more from transatlantic regulatory convergence to the extent the USA 
and EU remove existing NTBs in a non-discriminatory manner (Cottier et al., 2014, pp. 4–5). In this 
respect, the methodology for transatlantic regulatory convergence will have a critical importance in 
determining the implications of TTIP for Turkey especially in deciding upon the most feasible 
mechanism to re-engage with the emerging transatlantic commercial framework. 
7 | CONCLUSION 
If successfully concluded and ratified by the United States and EU, TTIP will have significant 
economic and policy implications for members and other countries contingent upon its ability to 
dismantle outstanding trade and investment barriers and to ensure higher regulatory convergence in 
the Atlantic region and beyond. While different estimations have so far been produced for the impact 
of the agreement upon the Turkish economy, they do not account for significant potential implications 
of the regulatory agenda underpinning TTIP and alternative/parallel mechanisms for Turkey to better 
engage with transatlantic economies. 
Even though NTBs lie at the heart of market access, tariffs remain a significant barrier to US and 
EU exports destined to Turkey, especially in the farming sector. Materialisation of the TTIP project 
will augment US industrial exports to Turkey because of the Customs Union, whereas a “TTIP plus 
Turkey” that also removes Turkish tariffs on agricultural products will boost imports in this sector 
both from Europe and the United States. Tariff-only scenarios suggest only modest benefits to Turkish 
exporters in various product groups. Comprehensive “TTIP plus Turkey” scenarios are where greater 
benefits lie for Turkish as well as transatlantic exporters depending on comparative advantage in 
product groups especially in manufacturing. However, the Turkish farming sector will potentially be 
affected negatively from deeper trade liberalisation that would entail the removal of NTBs owing to 
low productivity in the sector and poorer SPS standards. Unless the government undertakes costly 
investments to improve production standards, Turkish agri-food exporters will enjoy lower benefits 
than expected from market-opening scenarios, which would also lead to unemployment in rural areas. 
A comprehensive baseline scenario may also cause an investment diversion from Turkey that might 
be partially offset by Turkey’s joining the transatlantic FTA or a Turkish engagement in a flanking 
agreement with the United States (e.g., a BIT or FTA covering investment). Nevertheless, a “TTIP 
plus Turkey” scenario (or signing of a flanking agreement with the USA) will require Turkey to 
commit to an ISDS tribunal and higher standards for protection of investors in addition to eliminating 
outstanding investment barriers in protected Turkish service industries. There is no sustainable 
evidence to suggest that Turkey could ensure substantive export gains in services in an association 
 scenario, whereas imports will likely grow in professional and some other service sectors. Finally, the 
liberalisation of government procurement markets under a “TTIP plus Turkey” option is likely to lead 
to internal challenges as well as opportunities for Turkish producers in Western markets. Nevertheless, 
the market access impacts of TTIP per se for services and government procurement might be 
negligible since Turkey will potentially undersign other agreements with Atlantic economies before 
the materialisation of a “TTIP plus Turkey” scenario. 
The regulatory content of a transatlantic agreement will further calibrate expected gains and costs 
in different scenarios. Adoption of stronger disciplines in competition policy, subsidies, SOEs and 
trade facilitation as well as government procurement is likely to have “procompetitive” effects on the 
Turkish economy despite limited implementation costs. However, these disciplines as well as others 
are likely to shrink the government’s policy space to intervene in markets for developmental objectives 
and cost-effective healthcare policies. Labour and environmental standards, IPRs, as well as SPS-
related rules, seem to be major “norm-setting” areas with potentially higher economic costs than 
benefits in case of Turkey’s association with TTIP. Potential compliance costs are likely to be smaller 
in a baseline scenario since Turkish firms will benefit from positive spillovers in the form of better 
access to transatlantic markets without Turkey’s association with TTIP, especially if the USA and EU 
remove remaining NTBs in a non-discriminatory manner. Furthermore, Turkey may still diversify its 
ties with the USA by adopting more sophisticated export promotion strategies that would address the 
issues of scale, quality, consumer taste, logistics and product mismatch. 
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